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Lower Salaries and No Options?
On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay
Abstract
We estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal
stock prices for a sample of 598 US CEOs. The model is widely used in the compensation literature,
but it predicts that almost all of the CEOs in our sample should hold no stock options. Instead,
CEOs should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies. For a typical
value of relative risk aversion, almost half of the CEOs in our sample would be required to purchase
additional stock in their companies from their private savings. The model predicts contracts that
would reduce average compensation costs by 20% while providing the same incentives and the same
utility to CEOs. We investigate a number of extensions and modications of the standard model,
but nd none of them to be satisfactory. We conclude that the standard principal agent model
typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts. One reason may be that
executive pay contracts are suboptimal.
JEL Classication: G30, M52
Keywords: Executive Compensation, Stock Options
We dont give options because it would be a lottery ticket. (Warren Bu¤et)
There will be no new stock option grants from Microsoft. Instead, we will award actual
stock to our employees. (Steve Ballmer, Microsoft)
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the optimal structure of CEO pay, or, more specically, the optimal balance
between stock, options and base salary in executive compensation contracts. We develop a new
methodology to estimate and test e¢ cient contracting models and apply it to a model of e¢ cient
contracting that is widely used in the literature on executive compensation. This model assumes
constant relative risk aversion and lognormally distributed stock prices. On this basis we determine
optimal contracts for a sample of CEOs and conclude that the model cannot generate observed
contracts. In particular, it rarely predicts options. We explore a number of alternative modeling
approaches but nd none of them to be convincing. We conclude that we need a di¤erent contracting
model to understand salient features of executive compensation contracts. Our results would also
be consistent with the view that observed compensation practice su¤ers from signicant defects
and therefore cannot be explained by an e¢ cient contracting model.
The literature on the structure of executive compensation contracts has developed two comple-
mentary perspectives on executive stock options.1 One perspective highlights the fact that stock
options are expensivebecause they are risky (e. g. Oyer and Schaefer, 2005). For typical pa-
rameter values, an option that is worth $100 to diversied investors may be worth only $20-$40
to an undiversied, risk-averse CEO. This perspective emphasizes the participation constraint of
the CEO, but it neglects incentives. From another perspective, stock options are cheapbecause
they provide more incentives for the same dollar outlay than an equivalent investment in stock, so
companies save on compensation costs for providing incentives (e. g. Hall and Murphy, 2000). This
perspective focuses only on the incentive compatibility constraint. We bring these two perspectives
together in the context of a complete contracting model and argue that their relative importance
depends on whether the model also features downward constraints on xed salaries.
To illustrate this point, consider a simple numerical example. Suppose a company can provide
1Despite the long list of references at the end of this paper, we make no attempt here to survey the large literature
on executive stock options, let alone the still larger literature on executive compensation. Excellent surveys on
various aspects of the subject include Abowd and Kaplan (1999), Murphy (1999), Prendergast (1999), Core, Guay,
and Larcker (2002), and Hall and Murphy (2003).
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the same incentives (and therefore induce the same action by the CEO) with either one share with
a market value of $100 and a subjective value (certainty equivalent) of $40, or with options with a
market value of $95 and a subjective value of $25.
Stock Options
Market Value $100 $95
  Subjective Value $40 $25
= Risk Premium $60 $70
If base salaries are rigid, then only market values are relevant and options are always a cheaper
way to provide the same incentives. In this example, the company saves $5 (=$100-$95) by using
options. If the CEOs base salary is variable however, then stock dominates options. In this case,
the company incurs additional compensation costs of $70 if incentives are provided through options
(award options worth $95, reduce base salary by $25). The same incentives cost the company only
$60 if incentives are provided with stock. We argue that the situation described in this numerical
example is the empirically relevant one.
We therefore calibrate a principal agent model of e¢ cient contracting that has become standard
in the literature on executive compensation contracts, especially in quantitative analyses of the
design features of these contracts. The model combines preferences with constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) and lognormally distributed prices. Applications of this model to executive
compensation date back at least to Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991).2 Other models,
like those using preferences with constant absolute risk aversion or normally distributed prices,
are seldom used, and mostly to generate qualitative results and closed form solutions, rarely to
estimate, calibrate, or simulate models or to obtain quantiable results.3 Hence, we feel entitled to
argue that our modeling approach implements a variant of the conventionalmodel.
2CRRA preferences and lognormal prices have been used by Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Hall and
Murphy (2000), (2002), Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000), Hall and Knox (2004), Jenter (2002) and Oyer and Schaefer
(2003). Closely related are models that combine CRRA-preferences with geometric binomial trees or geometric
Brownian motion models of stock price development that generate identical or similar distributions of stock prices.
Binomial models were used by Huddart (1994) and Carpenter (1998), Brownian motion models by Tian (2001),
Johnson and Tian (2000a), (2000b), and Ingersoll (2002).
3Feltham and Wu (2001) and Baker and Hall (2004) use CARA-normal models. Nohel and Todd (2005) use
CRRA-preferences with a uniform distribution, Henderson (2002) uses CARA-preferences with geometric Brownian
motions, and Carpenter (2000) uses hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA). Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia (2000)
use HARA-utility and a Gamma-distribution in an analytic model. Haubrich and Popova (1998) is one of the few
studies that use CARA-preferences in a calibration exercise. They also use a discrete state space model. Lambert
and Larcker (2004) use CRRA-preferences with a truncated normal distribution of stock prices.
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We develop a new methodology to applying and testing this model: We rst reformulate the
model so that it can be calibrated to an individual CEO with publicly available data. We then
estimate the relevant model parameters for a sample of 598 CEOs. In particular, we aggregate
option holdings into a representative option and estimate wealth from previous years income of
the CEO. For risk aversion we use a grid of values that cover the range which other researchers
have suggested as plausible. Then we numerically determine the optimal contract for each level
of risk aversion and each CEO in our dataset. Finally, we compare the optimal contracts implied
by the model with the actual contracts we observe and evaluate whether they are statistically and
economically di¤erent.
Our main result is that the model cannot account for a prominent feature of 96% of the CEOs
in our sample: we almost never obtain stock options as part of an optimal contract. While the
CEOs in our sample hold on average options on 1.3% of their companies, the model cannot account
for more than 0.1% even for very low levels of risk aversion and predicts that most CEOs should
not have any stock options at all. An immediate implication is that CEOs should also receive lower
base salaries and more restricted stock. Indeed, for a typical level of risk aversion, 47% of the CEOs
in our sample should receive no base salary at all and use some of their private savings to purchase
additional stock in their companies. The e¢ ciency gains implied by the model are economically
signicant. We nd that contracts that provide the same level of expected utility and the same
incentives to the CEO would be cheaper by 20% or $12.3 million on average.
We investigate some generalizations of this set-up and allow for more general contracts. Firstly,
we drop the constraint that option holdings must be non-negative. It turns out that this constraint
is binding in almost all cases and optimal unconstrained contracts have much higher stock holdings
(more than twice the observed level) as well as negative option holdings such that pay for perfor-
mance sensitivities for higher stock prices are generally positive but small. In order to benchmark
our results we also calibrate the general nonlinear contract that is theoretically optimal. This shows
that the conventional (CRRA-lognormal) model implies concave contracts that emphasize sticks
over carrots: the penalties for stock price decreases are large, whereas the additional pay for stock
price increases is small. By comparison, observed contracts emphasize carrotsand feature large
gains for stock price increases but protect the CEO against large losses. In principle, the general
nonlinear contract could be implemented by ring the CEO for signicant underperformance, but
observed contributions of CEO-turnover to pay for performance-sensitivity are much smaller than
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implied by the contracts found by the conventional model.4
A number of papers argue that options are awarded to provide risk-taking incentives, so that
the CEO is willing to adopt projects that increase value and risk.5 We therefore analyze whether
the optimal contracts implied by our model change the CEOs risk tolerance relative to observed
contracts. We nd that the optimal contract with non-negative option holdings only slightly reduces
risk taking incentives. This e¤ect appears too weak to explain the option holdings in observed
contracts.
We recompute all our results for a model that incorporates personal and corporate taxes. We
document the tax advantage of options, but this aspect does not change our main results. We
also check for possibly incorrect measurements of wealth and contract convexity, as well as for
alternative distributional assumptions. We nd that our analysis is robust to errors in these three
dimensions. Similarly, we argue that hedging by the CEO through trading in the stock market is
unlikely to change our results. We conclude that the standard version and several variants of the
principal agent model cannot accommodate stock options, so that this model is also ill-suited to
analyze design features of stock option contracts.6,7
We can reconcile the model with observed contracts by assuming that base salaries cannot
be adjusted downward, just as suggested by the example above. The reason is that a decrease
in options is always associated with a decrease in base salary and an increase in stock holdings.
We nd only limited support for the implications of this assumption and regard this way to x
the model as implausible. Taking an altogether di¤erent perspective, our results could be cited
as supporting evidence for the view that CEO compensation does not conform to the e¢ cient
contracting paradigm, and that stock options are a vehicle for rent extraction.8 We discuss this
view in the concluding section.
4The literature on CEO turnover goes back at least to Coughlan and Schmidt (1985). See also Kaplan (1994).
Brickley (2003) summarizes the subsequent discussion by arguing that the economic signicance of CEO turnover is
small.
5This argument goes back to Smith and Stulz (1985). We discuss the literature on this topic in greater detail
below.
6Several design features have been analyzed in the literature. Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin (1998) and
Huddart, Jagannathan, and Saly (1999) discussion reloading. Meulbroek (2001) models indexing of strike prices, and
Hall and Murphy (2000) analyze optimal strike prices. The valuation model of Sircar and Xiong (2003) allows for
resetting as well as reloading.
7Core, Guay, and Larcker (2002) also recognize this limitation of existing research in their survey. Oyer and
Schaefer (2005) reject explanations for stock options based on incentives for non-executive employees. Core, Guay,
and Verrecchia (2003) provide more evidence against the standard principal agent model based on the analysis of
non-price performance measures.
8Bebchuk and Fried (2004) regard the observed structure of executive compensation as evidence for rent extraction.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) adopt this view only for companies that have weak governance systems.
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Our empirical approach is new and compares with two other methodologies that are widely
applied in the literature.9 Several authors have calibrated a model like ours in order to analyze
various aspects of executive compensation contracts by making parametric assumptions about a
typical CEO.10 However, then conclusions are sensitive to parametric assumptions that di¤er
across CEOs, so calibrating the model to observed parameter values of individual CEOs puts our
conclusions on a rmer empirical foundation. An alternative approach is to explore the implica-
tions of e¢ cient contracting models using regression analysis.11 Cross-sectional regressions test
the qualitative, directional implications of theoretical models, whereas our approach also tests the
quantitative implications, which is a more stringent test. However, we have to make additional
assumptions about functional forms that are absent from reduced-form regressions. To the best of
our knowledge, the only structural test of a principal agent model of compensation is Margiotta
and Miller (2000), who do not look at options and cannot reject the implications of their model.
The following Section 2 develops the theoretical model in detail. Section 3 explains our empirical
methodology and how to implement the model. Section 4 presents and discusses our empirical
results for alternative contracting environments. Section 5 evaluates the implications of these
contracts for investment incentives. Section 6 performs a number of robustness checks on our
analysis. In Section 7 we investigate modications of the base model that may help to reconcile
it with the empirical evidence. In Section 8 we summarize or ndings and present some further
thoughts about the limitations of our approach and directions for future research. The more
technical aspects of our analysis can be found in the appendix.
9See also Garen (1994), Haubrich (1994), Haubrich and Popova (1998), and Margiotta and Miller (2000) for
di¤erent econometric approaches. None of these studies allows for stock options. Hall and Murphy (2002) conclude
that stock options are a particularly expensive way to convey compensation,but they do not investigate the relative
costs of providing incentives.
10The closest paper to ours based on this paradigm is Lambert and Larcker (2004), who solve a complete principal
agent model and seem to come to di¤erent conclusions from ours. We discuss their work below. An incomplete list
of calibration exercises includes Lambert, Larcker, and Verrechia (1991), Hall and Murphy (2000), (2002), Hall and
Knox (2004), and Jenter (2002).
11See the literature cited in footnote 39 below and the discussion in the survey of Core, Guay, and Larcker (2002),
section 3.2. Some papers nd results that support the principal agent model, e. g. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999),
and Kedia and Mozumdar (2002). Others come to di¤erent conclusions, e. g. Core and Guay (2002b) who contra-
dict Aggarwal and Samwicks ndings on methodological grounds, and Yermack (1995), who reports that variables
associated with agency models explain almost none of the cross-sectional variation in the use of options.
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2 Theoretical Model
We develop a single-period principal agent framework, following Holmström (1979). The risk-
neutral principal (shareholders) o¤ers a contract to the risk-averse and e¤ort-averse agent (CEO).
The CEO consumes only at date T , which marks the end of the period. At this point in time the
market value of the rm equals PT . We ignore leverage and do not distinguish between the market
value of equity and the market value of the rm. The principal cannot observe the agents e¤ort
directly. As a consequence, the contract cannot be a function of e¤ort, but it can be a function of
PT .
Technology and Uncertainty. The end of period value of the rm PT depends on the e¤ort
e of the CEO, e 2 [0;1), and a standard normal random variable u. We use risk-neutral pricing
throughout and denote the risk-free rate of interest by rf . We will discuss our valuation approach
in greater detail below (see p. 7). We specify:12










; u  N (0; 1) : (1)
Hence, the distribution of PT (u; e) is log-normal with expected present value under the risk-neutral
density equal to P0 = E [PT exp f rfTg].13 P0 (e) satises standard monotonicity and concavity
assumptions typically made for production functions, so @P0@e > 0 and
@2P0
@e2
< 0. In any rational
expectations equilibrium, P0 is equal to the market value of equity at the e¤ort level e chosen by
the manager under the given contract, so P0 (e) is equal to the observed market capitalization.
Permissible Contracts. We initially assume that the contract can be described by three para-
meters: a base salary , the number of shares in the company nS (expressed as a fraction of all
shares outstanding), and the number of options on the companys stock nO (also expressed in terms
of the number of shares outstanding). We further assume that all options granted to the CEO have
identical maturity T and strike price K. We will later discuss extensions of our base model to allow
for multiple strike prices. The strike price K is expressed as the strike price for nO = 1, i.e., for
12This expression assumes a company that does not pay dividends. For a company that pays dividends, P0(e)
needs to be replaced with P0(e) exp f dTg for the purpose of valuing options, where d is the dividend yield. We
adjust for dividends in our empirical work but abstract from them here (see also the discussion below Table 1 on p.
14). The density of the lognormal distribution is given in equation (21) in the appendix.
13Here and in the following all expectations are taken with respect to the probability distribution of u  N (0; 1).
We should really write P0 = E

PT (u; e) e
 rfT  and also write WT , T , etc. below as functions of u. However, we
submerge reference to u for ease of exposition.
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the whole company. We denote by W0 the wealth of the CEO that is not invested in the rms
securities as of time t = 0 and refer to it as non-rm wealth.We assume that she invests all her
non-rm wealth at the risk-free rate rf , so her end of period wealth (at date T ) is:
WT = (+W0) exp frfTg+ nSPT (u; e) + nOmax fPT (u; e) K; 0g : (2)
Note that this specication implicitly assumes that base pay (including bonus payments) is paid
out today and invested, while all other components of pay lead to cash ows to the CEO at date
T .
Preferences. The CEOs utility is separable in wealth and e¤ort and has constant relative risk
aversion with risk-aversion parameter :14
U (WT ; e) = V (WT )  C (e) = W
1 
T
1     C (e) : (3)
The costs of e¤ort are assumed to be given by some convex cost function C (e) with @C@e > 0 and
@2C
@e2
> 0. We assume that the CEO has outside employment opportunities that give her expected
utility U . Expected utility is E [U (WT ; e)], where expectations are taken with respect to the
distribution of WT from (2).
Risk-Neutral Pricing. We assume risk-neutral pricing in order to ensure consistency of our
approach. This is necessary as we do not distinguish between rm-specic risk and market risk.
We require that a risk-neutral CEO should value options in the same way as a diversied market,
which implies that the certainty equivalent value of one option converges to its Black-Scholes-
value as risk aversion () converges to zero in the context of our model. Suppose by contrast we
would introduce a risk-premium  > rf on the companys stock in the present model, without
also allowing the CEO to trade in the stock market to obtain the market risk premium. Then any
CEO with su¢ ciently low risk aversion (low ) would value the companys stock and stock options
higher than the market and the certainty equivalent would exceed the Black Scholes value. The
reason is that investing in her own companys securities would be the only way the CEO could
then obtain an expected return above the risk-free rate. In order to avoid the paradoxical outcome





1  (which would make U(WT ; e) continuous in  at
 = 1) for numerical reasons.
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that the CEO is willing to pay a premium above the market price on her companys securities, we
work with risk-neutral pricing in (1). E¤ectively, this amounts to the assumption that all risk in
the model is rm-specic. We discuss this further in Section 6 below and argue that the implied
approximation error is small. By contrast, the opposite assumption - treating all risk as systematic
- would seriously bias our results.15
Theoretical Solution. We apply the two-stage approach of Grossman and Hart (1983) and ask
which contract is optimal for implementing a given level of e¤ort. Denote the pay of the manager
in currency units of time T by
T =  exp (rfT ) + nSPT + nOmax fPT  K; 0g : (4)
Note that WT = W0 exp frfTg + T . We denote the present value of expected pay by 0 =
E [exp f rfTgT ]. Then:
0 = + nSP0 + nOBS ; (5)
where BS is the Black-Scholes value of the option. The principals problem then is to nd the
contract that implements the chosen e¤ort level e with the lowest costs:
min
(;nS ;nO)
0 = + nSP0 + nOBS (6)
s:t: E [U (WT ; e)]  U ; (7)
e = arg max
e2[0;1)
E [U (WT ; e)] ; (8)
0  nS  1; nO  0 (9)
+W0  0 : (10)
Here (7) represents the participation constraint, (8) represents the incentive compatibility con-
straint, and (9) denes admissible contracts. Condition (10) explicitly allows for negative base
salaries where the CEO invests some of her initial wealth into her companys securities. However,
15See Hall and Murphy (2000) and Tian (2001) for other approaches. The latter also concludes that CEOs sometimes
value options higher than the market. Cai and Vijh (2005) argue along the same lines as we do and show that
introducing the market index reduces the value of options to the CEO.
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the CEO cannot pay more than her total initial non-rm wealth.16
In a second step, the principal will search over all pairs of e¤ort e and minimized costs 0(e)
in order to nd the optimal e¤ort level e. We do not consider this second step in this paper. No
matter what the optimal e¤ort level e is, it must solve the rst step of the optimization problem
(6) - (10): a given contract is not optimal if the same e¤ort level can be implemented with a less
costly contract. It is this implication that we are going to check for observed CEO contracts in the
empirical part of this paper.
3 Empirical Methodology and Data
3.1 Empirical Implementation
Our rst step towards developing an implementable version of the model is to apply the rst-order
approach and to replace (8) with the respective rst order condition for utility maximization by
the CEO. We then discuss how we validate the applicability of the rst-order approach. Hence, we
replace the incentive compatibility constraint (8) with the rst order condition for (8):
d
de









= 0 : (11)
Here we have made use of the fact that P0 (e) , C(e) and their derivatives are not stochastic and
can therefore be taken outside of the expectations operator. In order to rewrite (11), we dene the












We can change the order of integration and di¤erentiation in (11) and (12) because the integration
limits do not depend on the variables with respect to which we di¤erentiate. We observe that in
the case of risk-neutrality ( = 0), we have dV (WT )dWT = 1 for all WT . Then it is easy to show that
UPPS equals nS + nON (d1), where N (d1) is the option delta from the Black-Scholes formula.
This is just the standard denition of pay for performance-sensitivity under risk-neutrality that
has been widely used in the analysis of executive stock options. This justies the denition of (12)
16Our qualitative results do not change if condition (10) is replaced by   0. Then  = 0 whenever program (6)
- (10) nds  < 0:
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as a utility-adjusted pay for performance-sensitivity. We can rewrite (11) using (12) as:
d
de
E [U (WT ; e)] = UPPS  dP0(e)
de
exp (rfT )  dC(e)
de
= 0 : (13)
Finally, we rearrange (13) and obtain:
UPPS = k (e) ; (14)
where: k (e)  exp f rfTg dC=de
dP0=de
; (15)
The function k (e) is well-dened as dP0=de > 0 for all e¤ort levels. k (e) depends only on the
parameters of the managers cost function and the technology of the company, but is independent
of the parameters of the contract and risk aversion. Equation (15) is a more useful version of the
rst order condition (11) for our numerical work because UPPS depends only on the observable
contract parameters, the CEOs wealth, and her risk-aversion , but not on the unknown functions
P0 (e) and C (e). The unknown value k(e) can be inferred from the data, because under the
null hypothesis that observed contracts are optimal, observed contracts must satisfy (15): k (e) =
UPPS
 
d; ndS ; n
d
O; ; P0 (e)

, where superscripts ddenote the contract parameters of the observed













= U + C (e). We obtain our nal program:
min
(;nS ;nO)
0 = + nSP0 + nOBS













UPPS (; nS ; nO; ; P0) = UPPS






0  nS  1; nO  0;    W0 :
The only unknown variable that remains in program (16) is , so we use a grid for various values
of  between 0.5 and 10. This interval encompasses the range of values for risk aversion that
researchers in the eld of executive compensation regard as reasonable.17 We also calibrated a
17There is no consensus on the correct value for the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. Campbell, Lo,
and McKinlay (1997), ch. 8, discuss the extensive literature in macroeconomics that has suggested values for  up
to 10 or 20 in order to reconcile asset pricing models with the equity premium puzzle. Chetty (2003) uses a model
of labor supply and nds estimates around 1. Extracting estimates of risk aversion from asset prices has also not
converged to a consensus. Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) summarize research on the subject (see their Table 7) and report
values between 0 and 55. The compensation literature typically uses lower values (e. g. Murphy, 1999, uses 1, 2, and
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simple model where the CEO can invest in a diversied portfolio and the risk-free asset and found
that values of  much below 2 lead to unrealistic predictions about the CEOs investment policies.18
Conditional on using the right value of  and assuming that the optimal contract indeed solves (16),
the optimal contract must be equal to the observed contract, i.e. (; nS ; n

O) = (
d; ndS ; n
d
O). If the
optimal contract di¤ers signicantly from the observed contract then either the assumed level of
risk aversion  is wrong or the observed contract is not optimal. Program (16) has a very intuitive
interpretation: We want to nd a contract that provides the CEO with the same utility and the
same incentives as the observed contract, but that is less costly to shareholders compared to the
observed contract.
The rst-order approach allows us to solve program (6) - (10) without making any further
assumptions on the cost function C (e) except convexity and further assumptions on the production
function P0 (e) except concavity. However, the agents objective E [U (WT ; e)] may still not be
concave in e¤ort and have multiple local optima, as WT is a convex function of PT . Then the
rst-order condition is satised at each of these local optima. The modied program (16) suggests
an optimal contract (; nS ; n

O), that satises the rst-order condition at the same e¤ort level e
as the observed contract
 




. This shows only that the global optimum under the existing
contract remains a local optimum under the contract that solves (16). This does not rule out
the possibility that the global optimum for the agent under the new contract implies an entirely
di¤erent e¤ort level e 6= e. If the e¤ort level chosen by the agent under the new contract is higher
(e > e), then no problem arises for our approach as this would also imply a higher value for the
rm P > P0. However, we need to verify that the agent does not choose a lower level of e¤ort
under the contract that solves program (16).
In our case, we cannot establish the validity of the rst-order approach analytically because
we restrict the shape of the optimal contract. Instead, we formulate a su¢ cient condition for the
applicability of the rst-order approach and validate it empirically. We prove the following result
in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 (First-order approach): Let (; nS ; n

O) be the optimal contract that solves
3).
18Consider a CEO with CRRA-utility who can invest in a market portfolio with  = 0:17 and a risk premium over
the risk-free rate of 4%. Then a CEO with  = 0:5 would leverage her portfolio and invest 277% of her wealth in the
market portfolio. With  = 1 she would still invest 138%, with  = 2 the portfolio would be 69% in the market and
31% in the risk-free asset.
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(16). Also, let e be the e¤ort level chosen under the existing contract. If
UPPS (; nS ; n

O; ; P )  UPPS






for all P  P0, then the agent will never choose an e¤ort level e < e under the new contract
(; nS ; n

O). If the restriction nO  0 in program (16) is relaxed, then condition (17) is always
satised for all contracts where nO  0.
Proposition 1 implies that checking condition (17) is su¢ cient to ensure that the CEO will not
choose a lower e¤ort level under the optimal contract from program (16) than under the existing
contract. We are not concerned about higher e¤ort levels as these lead to higher market values
of the rm and would therefore reinforce the claim that the existing contract is not optimal. We
validate (17) by checking this condition for a grid of 100 equally spaced values of P in the interval
(0; P0] whenever nO > 0.
3.2 Dataset
For implementing (16), we need data on the contract parameters d; ndS , and n
d
O, the CEOs wealth
W0, the rm value P0, the dividend yield d, the option maturity T , the strike price K, the stock
volatility , and the risk free rate rf . Our data are constructed from the Compustat ExecuComp
Database, which contains compensation data on 21,086 executives from 2.448 rms over the period
1992 to 2000. We rst identify all executives in the database who were CEO in 2000 and have a
continuous history (as CEO or as another executive with data on ExecuComp) of at least ve years
(1995-1999) in the database. We focus on CEOs in order to prevent correlations due to multiple
observations from the same rm.
We match P0 to the market capitalization at the 1999 scal year end and take the 1999 values
of the dividend yield d and the volatility  directly from the database. The xed salary d is
determined as the sum of salary and bonus in 2000 and includes all types of compensation other
than stock and options.19 Hence we implicitly assume that bonus payments have no relevance for
the CEOs incentives.20 We use only current-period data to estimate d. This ignores the fact that
the CEO receives base salary payments every year between now and T . Incorporating this feature
19More precisely, d is the sum of the following four ExecuComp data types: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, and
All Other Total. We do not include LTIP (long term incentive pay), as these are typically not awarded annually.
20This seems defensible. Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that the impact of stock options and stock on CEO wealth
dwarfs the impact of bonus payments.
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would have the same numerical impact as an increase in non-rm wealthW0, which we study below.
We therefore abstract from this feature.
ndS and n
d
O are the numbers of shares and options held by the CEO at the end of the 1999
scal year. ExecuComp does not provide details of all option parameters, and we approximate the
option portfolios held at the end of 1999 using the algorithm described by Core and Guay (2002a).
According to this algorithm, we approximate options granted before 1999 by two hypothetical
option grants that are calculated from information on, respectively, exercisable and unexercisable
options. We add the options granted in 1999 to these two hypothetical options grants in order
to arrive at an estimate of the option portfolio held at the end of the 1999 scal year. Then we
calculate the exercise price K and the maturity T of a representative option that aggregates the
salient features (value and sensitivity to price) of the CEOs option portfolio. We refer the reader
to Appendix B for further details. Appendix B also describes the procedure which we used to
estimate non-rm wealth from the CEOs past income.21 Later we perform robustness checks in
order to establish that our results do not depend on potential estimation errors.
From the initial 1,696 CEOs in 2000, we lose 103 CEOs for which necessary data items (stock
volatility in 1999 or adjustment factor) are missing, and 886 CEOs due to the required history of
at least ve years.22 The ve-year cut-o¤ provides a reasonable balance between the accuracy of
our estimates and sample size.23 Another 27 CEOs are lost because they were executives in more
than one company in at least one year of their history. For the remaining 680 CEOs we estimate
their options portfolio and their wealth from the ExecuComp database as described in Appendix
B. At this stage, we lose 17 CEOs because of inconsistent or missing data on their option holdings,
and 65 CEOs, because our wealth estimate is negative, which can happen if the amounts deducted
for the purchase of stock are large. We retain 598 CEOs in our sample that satisfy all our data
requirements. 21 CEOs (3.5%) have no options in their compensation package while 254 CEOs
(42%) have options on more than 1% of their company.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
21The only study we know of that uses an estimate of wealth is Becker (2005), who uses a Swedish dataset based
on tax lings. No such information is available for the U.S.
22We do not require that the CEOs have been CEO during the entire 5 years. We only require that they were CEO
in 2000.
23 If we required eight years of continuous history, we would retain only 360 CEOs compared to our current sample
of 598. Shortening the length of continuous history in the database required biases our wealth estimates downward.
Requiring an eight-year history would increase our median estimate of W0 by 27% (mean: 21%). We compensate for
this bias with appropriate robustness checks (see Section 6).
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Table 1A provides descriptive statistics for the main parameters and Table 1B displays similar
statistics for the larger group of executives in the ExecuComp database who were CEO in 2000. We
need to adjust the number of options for dividend payments because the CEO receives nO options
on a share with end of period value PT exp ( dT ) and nS shares with end of period value PT . In
order to render our statements on stock holdings and option holdings comparable, we will refer
to nS as the number of shares and to nO exp ( dT ) as the number of options. (See also footnote
12 on p. 6 above.) While the CEOs in our sample are similar with respect to the value of their
stock holdings, our data requirements have a tendency to exclude CEOs with more options (mean
of 1.3% in the sample, 1.5% in ExecuComp) and lower salaries (mean of $2m in the sample, $1.7m
in ExecuComp). Also, CEOs in our sample are somewhat more experienced (age 57 in our sample,
55 in the database). Finally, note that the stock volatility is lower in our sample (38%) than in the
full ExecuComp database (44%). In view of our results, the sample is biased in favor of the model:
the savings from recontracting predicted by our model are higher for higher volatility, higher option
holdings, and for younger, less wealthy CEOs. We would therefore expect even stronger results if
we could establish reliable parameter estimates for the larger sample.
4 Optimal Contracts and Observed Contracts
We divide our analysis into two parts. In the rst part we restrict ourselves to contracts with
non-negative option holdings nO. We therefore require contracts to be (weakly) convex. This is our
benchmark case. In a second step we relax this constraint and allow for negative option holdings by
the CEO. We then drop the assumption that contracts are piecewise linear and extend our analysis
to more general forms of nonlinearity. Finally, we discuss how our analysis extends to the case with
multiple options.
4.1 Optimal contracts with non-negative option holdings
Table 2 reports the results for the case where option holdings are restricted to be non-negative.24
[Insert Table 2 about here]
24We solve program (16) and its variants for each CEO in our dataset with the Nelder-Mead simplex method as
implemented in SAS Proc IML. We also recomputed our core results with Matlab and did not nd any di¤erences
beyond numerical accuracy.
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Result 1: The model cannot replicate observed option holdings. The rst - and probably
most surprising - result is that stock options are almost never optimal for plausible levels of risk
aversion (see Table 2A). The model predicts positive option holdings only for 1.3% of all CEOs
at  = 3, and even for extremely low levels of risk aversion this fraction does not rise above 18%
( = 0:5). Moreover, whenever the model does predict options as part of the optimal contract,
the fraction of options predicted is miniscule: for  = 3 optimal option holdings are 0.003%.
This represents less than 0.3% of actual option holdings (compare Table 1). This indicates the
complete failure of the model with respect to predicting the option component of observed contracts.
Moreover, we only obtain positive option holdings for those cases where the constraint    W0
is binding, in all other cases optimal option holdings are always zero. This result is striking and
shows that the constraint nO  0 is almost always binding to produce a corner solution at nO = 0.
For low levels of risk aversion we sometimes cannot validate the applicability of the rst-order
approach. For  = 0:5 there are 3 CEOs with positive option holdings under the contract that solves
(16) where condition (17) is violated. We can always ensure the general validity of the rst-order
approach for all CEOs and for all values of  equal to 1 or higher.
Result 2: CEOs should hold more stock. Table 2A also shows that stock holdings should
be higher. The increase for our base case ( = 3) is from an average 2.29% (see Table 1) to
2.75%, or half a percentage point. It follows directly from the mechanics of the model that lower
option holdings are balanced by higher stock holdings in order to maintain incentives. Hence,
stock holdings in optimal contracts are uniformly higher, and for any given level of risk aversion
the algorithm provides a unique optimal level of stock holdings commensurate with maintaining
incentives. Table 2A also demonstrates that the number of additional shares required to be held
by the CEO decreases markedly as the CEOs risk aversion  increases. This implies that the
number of shares given to the CEO to replace one option decreases with risk aversion. As the
CEOs risk-aversion rises, stock becomes progressively better at providing incentives because stock
also pays o¤ for lower stock prices where marginal utility is comparatively high. Then fewer shares
need to be granted to replace one option.
Result 3: CEOs should receive lower base salaries. We can observe from Table 2A that
mean and median base salaries decline substantially if we compare the base salaries suggested by
the model with actual base salaries. If we substitute stock for less valuable options, then the base
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salary needs to decrease so that the CEOs expected utility stays constant and the participation
constraint (7) remains binding. Table 2A shows that in a large number of cases the CEOs in our
sample should have negative base salaries according to the model. If base salaries are negative,
then CEOs are required to invest some of their private savings in their companys stock in addition
to the stock grants they receive. For  = 3, 47% of CEOs receive no base salary and are required
to invest some of their private wealth into their rm.
Note that, as the CEOs risk aversion  increases, the pay cuts suggested by our model decrease
substantially. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that the number of shares each CEO
receives to replace one option decreases in . Then the cut in base pay necessary to hold her
expected utility constant falls as well. In Table 2B we relate the investment into rm stock to the
CEOs wealth. While the cut in base salaries appears dramatic, it is moderate compared to most
CEOs wealth. For  = 3, the CEOs invest on average $2:26m or 10.5% of their wealth in their
rmsstock.
We also investigate how base salaries are correlated with wealth (results not tabulated). The
correlation is negative and signicant, ranging from  0:51 for  = 0:5 to  0:20 for  = 10. This
is intuitive as higher wealth leads to lower absolute risk aversion and therefore a higher ratio of
shares to be exchanged for one option. Recall that we calculate wealth on the basis of past income
(see Appendix B). So, according to the model, some CEOs received too high xed salaries in the
past, leading to a larger accumulation of non-rm wealth. According to the model these contracts
need a stronger rebalancing away from options and xed salary to more stock.
Result 4. Implied savings from optimal contracts are signicant. We need to check if
the di¤erences between observed and actual contracts are economically signicant. We address this
issue by comparing the expected costs of total compensation of optimal contracts, 0, to the costs
of observed compensation contracts, d0 . Hence 
d
0   0 (expressed as a percentage of d0) is our
measure for evaluating economic signicance, which is tabulated in Table 2B.
Based on our model and assuming  = 3, 19.6% of total costs of CEO compensation could
be saved on average by moving from observed contracts to the contracts suggested by the model
(median 15.6%). While this number is signicant as a proportion of compensation costs as well as in
absolute dollar terms ($12.3m (mean), respectively, $2.4m (median) per CEO), the number is not
large in relation to the size of most companies. The average savings as a percentage of rm value
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is merely 0.34%. However, we only consider CEOs in our analysis. Since typically the structure of
compensation packages is similar for all executives within a single company, the savings would be
higher than suggested by Table 2 if companies adjusted the pay structure for all their executives.
Altogether we conclude that the di¤erence between observed contracts and contracts generated by
the conventional model are statistically and economically signicant.
4.2 Optimal contracts with unrestricted option holdings
The previous analysis suggests that the non-negativity constraint on options in the optimal contract
(nO  0) is binding in almost all cases. We now replace this constraint with the weaker restriction
that the CEO cannot have a short position in options that exceeds her long position in stock:
nO exp f dTg+nS  0. This restriction is necessary to guarantee that the CEOs terminal wealth
WT is positive in all states of the world. We refer to the contract with this relaxed restriction
as the unrestricted option contract, whereas we call the contract with the stronger restriction
nO  0 restricted option contract. We recompute all our previous results for the unrestricted
option contract and present the results in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The impact is dramatic. For all CEOs for whom we found zero optimal option holdings in the
previous section, we now obtain negative option holdings. At the same time, optimal stock holdings
almost double from 2:75% to 5:33% ( = 3). The resulting contract is now concave for 98.7% of all
CEOs. Pay for performance-sensitivity for low stock prices (below the strike price of the option) is
signicantly higher because of the higher stock component. For stock prices above the strike price
of the option, pay for performance-sensitivity is miniscule. For a large number of CEOs, pay for
performance sensitivity is zero for higher stock prices. In these cases, the number of options just
o¤sets the number of shares. Average base salaries are lower ( $16:6m instead of  $1:65m for
 = 3) and the proportion of wealth that CEOs would need to invest in their companiesstock is
also much higher (47:5% instead of 10:5%). The unrestricted contract also generates much higher
savings (36:5% instead of 19:6% before). We therefore conclude that our model implies that optimal
contracts are concave except in very few cases.
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4.3 General nonlinear contracts
In order to understand why the optimal contract features negative option holdings for most CEOs,
we now consider contracts where we do not restrict the nonlinearity to piecewise linear contracts.
Instead we now analyze the solution to the optimal contracting problem (6) - (10) for a general
function  (PT ) that is not constrained to be implemented with stock and options. In Appendix
A.1 we derive the following solution for  (PT ), where 1 > 0 and 0 are parameters that depend
on the production function P0 (e) and the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (7) and (8):
 (PT ) =
8><>: (0 + 1 lnPT )
1=  W0 exp (rfT ) if PT  P
 W0 exp (rfT ) + " if PT < P
, (18)
where P = exp (("   0) =1) and the constant " is the minimum level of wealth that must be
left to the CEO in all states of the world. This ensures that the argument of the utility function
is bounded away from zero so that utility is bounded away from minus innity. In Appendix A.1
we also show that the optimal contract is concave for all prices PT above a certain threshold that
exceeds P for  < 1 and equals P for   1. For  < 1, the function is convex for a range above P .
In all cases the function is locally convex at P . We will refer to the contract with the pay function
(18) as the general nonlinear contract.
The fact that the optimal general nonlinear contract features a convex region holds out the
promise that we did not detect the potential usefulness of options because contracts with only
one option may be ill-suited to approximate a nonlinear function with convex and concave regions.
Clearly, the  (PT ) function (18) is not implementable with shares and options, although it can be
approximated arbitrarily well with a su¢ ciently large number of call and put options with di¤erent
strike prices.25 We can still estimate optimal contracts like (18) using our methodology by simply
optimizing over the free parameters 0, 1, and " without parameterizing the full model.26 In
particular, we can do so without specifying the production function P0 (e), the CEOs cost function
C (e), or the Lagrange multipliers on (7) and (8). Figure 1 shows the results for one representative
CEO and Table 4 tabulates the results for the entire sample.27
25Related claims can be found in Ross (1976) and Farmer and Winter (1986).
26For numerical reasons, we restrict the CEOs minimum terminal wealth " by "  P0=100; 000. When we relax this
restriction, the algorithm becomes unstable. In Table 4, the numerical problems of relaxing this constraint become
apparent for  = 10, where we lose 52% of the CEOs because the algorithm did not converge. The only notable e¤ect
of relaxing this constraint is that the threshold P=P0 in Table 4 gets even smaller and that average savings slightly
increase.
27We note that the validity of the rst-order approach for the general non-linear contract is assured by Jewitt
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[Insert Table 4 about here]






















Figure 1: The gure shows end of period wealth WT for the observed contract (solid line), the opti-
mal unrestricted option contract (dotted line) and the optimal general nonlinear contract (dashed
line) for one representative CEO whose parameters are close to the median of the sample. The
parameters are  = $1; 2m, nS = 0:42%, nO = 0:50% for the observed contract. Initial non-rm
wealth is W0 = $9:1m. P0 is $3:70 bn and K=P0 is 63%, T = 8:5 years, rf = 6:6%, d = 2:3%. All
calculations are for  = 3.
The gure shows alternative contracts for one CEO with  = 3 who is representative of the
sample. It shows the observed contract with one representative option, the unrestricted option
contract and the general nonlinear contract. The horizontal axis in the gure is scaled by the
current stock price, so that 1 corresponds to a terminal stock price PT equal to the current price.
The general nonlinear contract is highly concave with an enormous slope for low terminal stock
prices (below 10%-20% of the current price). We characterize the function in Table 4 by reporting
the average cut-o¤ price P from (18) as a percentage of the current stock price. Evidently, this
cuto¤ is very small (0.5% - 4.2% of the current stock price) for moderate levels of risk aversion.28
Hence, the point of the local convexity of the optimal contract is in a region of very low (and hence
unlikely) stock prices.
(1988).
28The comparatively high values of P=P0 for  = 1 are due to the fact that the utility function is not continuous in
 at  = 1. We expect that this e¤ect would disappear if we could calculate optimal contracts for the related version
of the utility function (see footnote 14) that is continuous in  at  = 1.
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We report the slope of the contract by looking at changes in wealth if the standard normal
random variable u in (1) changes from its expected value 0 to  1,  4, +1, or +4. For example,
for  = 3, if u = +1 (one standard deviation above its mean), then wealth increases by 5.9% for
the optimal contract, whereas the same number is 107.4% for the actual contract. For u =  1, the
change is -6.7% for the optimal contract and -27.4% for the actual contract. Hence, for  = 3, the
1 standard deviation range exhibits a lower pay for performance sensitivity than the observed
contract and this di¤erence becomes more pronounced as risk aversion increases. We can also
measure the concavity of the optimal general nonlinear contract by the fact that a one standard
deviation decrease in u is accompanied by a larger absolute change in wealth (-6.7%) compared
to a one standard deviation increase of u (5.9%). The opposite is true for the observed contract,
where the decline (-27.36%) is much smaller than the corresponding increase (107.4%). For low
levels of risk aversion the optimal contract includes large penalties for extreme underperformance:
basically, the CEO loses more than 99% of her wealth if u falls more than 4 standard deviations
below its expected value, an event that has a probability of 0.0032%.
Overall, we can observe that the optimal general nonlinear contract di¤ers from the observed
contract not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. The observed contracts essentially rely on
carrotswhere the CEO receives large benets from performing above expectations and su¤ers lim-
ited penalties for underperformance. By comparison, the optimal general nonlinear contract relies
on sticksand the CEO receives only a comparatively small increase in wealth for outperforming
expectations, but su¤ers severe penalties from extreme underperformance.
The piecewise linear contract that can be implemented with one option tries to approximate the
optimal general nonlinear contract. We can gauge the quality of this approximation by comparing
the savings implied by these contracts. These are 45.2% for general nonlinear contracts and 36.5%
for unrestricted option contracts.
We could approximate the general nonlinear contract in Figure 1 with stock and with short
positions in several call options with di¤erent strike prices. By appropriately increasing the number
of di¤erent strike prices in the option portfolio we could approximate the optimal general nonlinear
contract  (PT ) arbitrarily well. Then the positions in all options except the one with the lowest
strike price would be short positions. We analyzed the case with stock and two options, where we
xed strike prices at 25% and 50% of todays price. We found that savings from such a contract
are 39.0% (results not tabulated) and therefore higher than those for unrestricted option contracts
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(36.5%, see Table 3), restricted option contracts (19.6%, see Table 2), but lower than those from
general nonlinear contracts (45.2%, see Table 4). The contracts suggested by such a model exhibit
even higher stock holdings compared to the model with only one option, with correspondingly more
negative positions in options. However, all other qualitative features are the same as those of the
model with one option only, so we do not discuss them here in more detail.
5 Investment incentives and optimal contracts
The discussion of the previous section leads us to the conclusion that long positions in options
are rarely part of an optimal contract. In this subsection we investigate another explanation for
the use of stock options that was rst formulated by Smith and Stulz (1985) and emphasizes the
fact that options provide incentives for managers to invest in risky projects. Indirect evidence in
support of this notion was found by a number of studies.29 We approach this question from the
perspective of our model as follows. A CEO would be deterred from investing in a positive NPV
project if the project increases the risk of the company and her utility decreases in the volatility
of the company, so that @EU@ < 0. Hence, we compute this derivative and determine by how much
the CEOs utility would fall from an increase in volatility by 1 percentage point (e. g., from 0.30 to
0.31) and compare this change in utility between the observed contract and the optimal contract
prescribed by the model.30 Table 5 summarizes our results.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
For example, for  = 3, utility decreases on average by 2.51% from a 1 percentage point increase
in volatility under the observed contract, by 3.00% under the optimal restricted contract, and by
4.42% with the optimal unrestricted contract. By comparison, the decline in utility is 18.37% under
the optimal general nonlinear contract, which is therefore signicantly more concave.
In Table 5B we provide another approach to the same data. Here, we dene a CEO as risk-
averse if her utility declines by more than 1% from a 1 percentage point increase in volatility, and
29Williams and Rao (2000) show that CEOs with more stock options tend to undertake risk-increasing acquisitions.
Tufano (1996) shows that companies in the gold mining industry hedge more if their executives own more stock and
less if they hold more options. Guay (1999) provides evidence that companies with more growth opportunities provide
their executives with more incentives to take risks. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) nd that stock options increase the
inclination to take risks in a study of oil and gas producers. Similarly, Li (2002) presents evidence consistent with
the view that companies continuously adjust the contracts of their CEOs if they deviate from contracts that provide
optimal risk-taking incentives.
30Guay (1999) analyzes sensitivies of wealth to risk by looking at 1%-changes in .
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as risk-neutral if her utility declines by less than 1%. With this denition of risk aversion and
risk neutrality, and for  = 3, 26.3% of all CEOs are classied as risk-neutral under the observed
contract, compared to 18.6% under the optimal restricted contract, and 8.7% under the optimal
unrestricted option contract. This percentage drops to a mere 1.3% under the general nonlinear
contract. We also applied other cuto¤s for separating risk-neutral from risk-averse CEOs. With
a 0.1% decline in utility as a cut-o¤, 95.3% of CEOs would be classied as risk-averse under the
observed contract, a proportion that increases to 99.5% and 100% under the restricted option
contract and the two concave contracts ( = 3).
We interpret these results as saying that observed contracts normally do not change the CEOs
attitude towards risk appreciably in one way or another compared to optimal restricted contracts.
The proportion of CEOs whose risk-aversion is practically neutralized by their option holdings (so
that @EU@  0) is small, no matter which denition of practically neutralizedwe apply. Even
compared to optimal unrestricted contracts - which are concave for most CEOs - the di¤erence
is very moderate. The picture is very di¤erent only for the general nonlinear contract (18) that
may carry a serious risk of underinvestment in risky projects. For this contract, the distortion of
risk aversion as shown in Table 5 is more substantial and the fraction of CEOs classied as risk-
neutral is signicantly smaller. We conclude that the use of stock options to create risk-taking
incentives might explain why we do not observe general nonlinear contracts, but this argument
does not appear strong enough to explain why observed contracts are convex instead of linear.31
6 Robustness Checks
In this section we discuss some of the assumptions made above in order to assess the robustness of
our conclusions presented so far. As a benchmark we choose the model with restricted option con-
tracts. While unrestricted option contracts or general nonlinear contracts generate higher savings,
they seem less realistic. Firstly, negative options holdings are never used. Secondly, concave payo¤s
are unsuitable for providing risk-taking incentives as demonstrated in the last section. Finally, the
implied investments in company stock compared to CEO wealth seem unrealistically large (47.5%
for unrestricted option contracts compared to 10.5% for restricted option contracts; compare Tables
2 and 3). We therefore hold that restricted option contracts provide the most realistic alternative
31Other authors have also expressed scepticism on the view that options uniformly increase risk-taking incentives,
see e. g. Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004).
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to observed contracts.
6.1 Measurement of Wealth
The variable measured with the least accuracy in our data is certainly initial non-rm wealth W0.
In order to establish how sensitive our results are to errors in initial wealth, we multiply our wealth
estimates by a multiplier MW and compute optimal contracts assuming  = 3. Results for other
levels of risk aversion are qualitatively similar. We consider multipliers MW in the range from 0:1
to 5. The main results are summarized in Figure 2. The main observations from the gure are
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Figure 2: Comparative statics for wealth. We vary our measure of wealth by multiplying W0
for each CEO by a constant factor MW between 0:1 and 5. All calculations are for  = 3. For
the base case, investment in stock relative to wealth and relative savings are reported in Table 2B,
stock holdings in Table 2A.
that (i) investment in stock as a percentage of wealth will increase in wealth (i. e., as a function of
MW ), (ii) stock holdings will increase in wealth, and (iii) savings from recontracting are a declining
function of wealth. On the whole we observe what we would expect as a result of constant relative
risk aversion, where absolute risk aversion falls as wealth increases. The e¤ect of an increase in
wealth is therefore the same as the e¤ect of a fall in risk aversion, which was amply documented
in Tables 2 - 5. Hence, none of our qualitative conclusions is a¤ected and the comparative static
properties of the model are very regular.
23
6.2 Measuring the convexity of contracts
Our analysis relies only on shares and stock options to measure pay for performance sensitivity. By
comparison, Jensen and Murphy (1990) also consider the incentives generated by bonus payments
and CEO dismissals as part of their measure of performance sensitivity. Of particular concern for
our analysis is the potentially incorrect measurement of the convexity of observed contracts. We
address these shortcomings here.
We run conventional logit regressions for CEO dismissals (see Brickley, 2003, for a brief summary
of the literature on CEO turnover). The dummy variable for dismissal equals one if a CEO who is
in the database in 1995 is recorded as resigned in one of the subsequent ve years. We regress
this dummy variable on the ve-year abnormal stock return from 1995-2000. We then use this
parameterization of the logistic function to establish the probability of ring the CEO as a function
of the stock return p (PT =P0) and redene end of period wealth as a function of terminal stock
prices (compare (2)) as:
WT =W0 exp frfTg+ (1  p (PT =P0)) [ exp frfTg+ nSPT (u; e) + nOmax fPT (u; e) K; 0g] :
(19)
Similar to Jensen and Murphy (1990) we assume that the CEO loses all her compensation in case
of dismissal, which is most likely an overstatement as it ignores severance pay. We then recompute
the utility adjusted pay for performance sensitivity using (19) instead of (2). The results are shown
in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Table 6 reveals that UPPS increases for high levels of risk aversion, but decreases for small levels
of risk aversion. The reason is that dismissals a¤ect performance sensitivity in two ways. First,
the potential loss of all future compensation payments increases UPPS because an upward shift
in the mean of the distribution reduces the CEOs risk of being red. However, with a probability
p (PT =P0) the CEO loses all her performance-related pay, so conditional on being red the CEOs
payo¤ is now independent of her performance, which reduces incentives. The weight on the two
e¤ects depends on the CEOs utility function and the higher her risk aversion, the more important
is the rst e¤ect and the less important is the second e¤ect.
We also measure the convexity of contracts directly. Observed contracts are piecewise linear, so
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we cannot use second order derivatives to analyze convexity. Instead, we use a discrete approach
and measure the di¤erence in slopes of WT with respect to PT from (2) and from (19) around the
strike price of the option.32 For (2) the change in slope is simply nO (the slope changes from nS
to nS + nO). We calculate this change in slope for (19) and nd that for 494 CEOs, dismissals
reduce the convexity of the WT -function, whereas the convexity increases for 104 of the CEOs
in our sample. 11 contracts become concave. (Results are not reported in the tables.) For the
median CEO, dismissals reduce the convexity of theWT -function by 4.86%, i.e. the change in slope
is 0:951nO in the model with dismissals compared to nO without dismissals, so the di¤erence is
economically negligible.
We also looked at bonus payments and tested if their sensitivity to stock price increases is
higher for high stock prices than for low prices. We found that bonus and salary changes make the
contracts more convex, although this e¤ect is mostly statistically insignicant.
We conclude that we measure the convexity of contracts correctly on average, even though
there is some cross-sectional variation arising from CEO turnover and changes in salaries that we
left out before. We note that our approach has the additional advantage that it uses only CEO-
specic variables and does not impose parameters from cross-sectional regressions based on the
whole sample on individual CEOs.
6.3 Alternative Technologies
The choice of the lognormal distribution, which has become standard for many applications may
bias the results against options. Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia (2000) suggest the Gamma distri-
bution as an alternative model for the technology in a principal agent model and show that it can
generate convex contracts for  = 0:5. We therefore repeat our analysis and replace the lognormal
distribution with the Gamma distribution and calibrate the distribution again to match the rst
two moments (market capitalization and standard deviation of returns). Table 7 summarizes the
main results.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
32More precisely, we measure the di¤erence in slopes of WT between u(K) + 1 and u(K)  1, where P (u(K)) = K
(see equation (1)).
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We conrm the result of Hemmer, Kim, and Verrecchia (2000): for  = 0:5, we obtain signicant
option holdings for all CEOs.33 However, for larger values of risk aversion the di¤erences between
the lognormal distribution and the Gamma distribution become small, and for   4 implied
savings are on average larger with the Gamma model than with the lognormal model. For reasons
discussed above, we do not believe the region below  = 1 to be particularly relevant and conclude
that this approach does not lead to a substantially more realistic model.
6.4 Market Risk and Firm-Specic Risk
In the discussion of our valuation approach above we briey hinted at the fact that our approach
may overstate the riskiness of options to the CEO as she could eliminate the market component
of this risk by trading in the market index, an aspect not included in our model. We check for the
importance of the distinction between rm-specic risk and market risk as follows. We estimate
rm-specic risk 2" by using the relationship 
2
" = 
2 22M , where 2M represents the volatility of
the market and  the CAPM-beta. We assume  = 1 for all companies in our sample and estimate
M = 0:17 for the year 2000. Then we numerically recalculate all contracts with 2" instead of 
2.
However, we still use total risk 2 in order to calculate the costs of options to the company. We
do not tabulate the results as they are similar to those reported above and none of the qualitative
results is a¤ected. Ultimately, a completely satisfactory analysis of rm-specic and systematic
risk must rest on a more complete model that explicitly models investments in the stock market.
Existing research based on numerical examples is consistent with our ndings.34
7 Interpretations and Extensions
The results from Section 4 leave us with the robust conclusion that observed practice does not
conform to the predictions of our model. In this section we investigate if appropriate modications
of our model would generate observed contracts as results of e¢ cient contracting.
33This leads also to a violation of the su¢ cient conditions for the validity of the rst-order approach in a large
number of cases. Hence, for low values of  this analysis is valid only if we are also prepared to assume conditions
stronger than just concavity of the production function and convexity of the cost function.
34See Jenter (2002), Ingersoll (2002) and Cai and Vijh (2005).
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7.1 Incorporating Taxes
So far our analysis ignores taxes. The optimal contracts calculated from our model suggest that
CEOs should receive no options, lower base salaries, and more restricted stock. In this subsection
we investigate the impact of taxes on our analysis. We di¤erentiate between personal and corporate
taxes. We carefully distinguish between restricted stock awarded by the company to the CEO and
unrestricted stock that the CEO either held previously or that she bought from her own funds at the
beginning of the contract period (t = 0). More specically, we make the following assumptions:35
Base salary. The xed component  of compensation is paid at time t = 0 and is fully taxed at
the personal level. For tax purposes it is regarded as a bonus and is therefore tax deductible at the
corporate level. However, if  < 0, then neither the company nor the CEO receives a tax credit as
we treat this as a purchase of unrestricted stock by the CEO.
Stock option grants. Stock options are exercised at time t = T . At this point in time, the gain
from exercising the options, PT  K, is taxed at the personal level and creates a deductible expense
for the company.
Restricted stock grants and unrestricted stock. Restricted stock may or may not be tax
deductible at the corporate level. Tax law allows expensing of restricted stock and base salary up to
a total of $1 million. Also, restricted stock can be expensed if it is awarded as part of a shareholder
approved incentive plan. We assume that this is always the case and treat restricted stock as a tax
deductible expense for the company at the end of the vesting period. At the personal level, the
CEO defers taxes on the grant until the time when vesting lapses and we assume that this is the
end of the contract period, t = T on the value PT per share. Unrestricted stock is a purchase by
the CEO from after-tax income and has no tax consequences other than taxes on dividends and
capital gains.
Dividends and capital gains. Dividends are taxed at the personal level at the time of payment.
We assume that the after tax dividend is reinvested in the companys stock. Capital gains can be
deferred indenitely and are never taxed.
35The analysis is based on Hall and Liebman (2000). The precise analysis of taxes is somewhat tedious. We
have prepared a short technical document that reparameterizes our model in order to allow for taxes along the lines
described in the text. This document is available from the authors upon request.
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We use a tax rate of 42% for personal taxes and a rate of 35% for corporate taxes.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Table 8 displays the results for the optimal restricted option contract. We now obtain larger
option holdings compared to the case without tax e¤ects (cf. nO = 0:003% in Table 2 to 0:028%
in Table 8 for  = 3). However, while the relative increase is substantial, the absolute increase is
marginal. The number of contracts with positive option holdings increases from 1.3% to 9.6% of
all CEOs. The favorable tax treatment of options also reduces the benets to the company from
19.6% of total pay (cf. Table 2B) to 13.4% of total pay. The number of CEOs for whom we cannot
verify the validity of the rst-order approach increases somewhat relative to the case without taxes.
For realistic levels of risk aversion, this a¤ects less than 10% of our sample. We conclude that tax
e¤ects explain a small part of the use of stock options for a small number of CEOs, but the e¤ect
is not nearly su¢ cient to explain observed compensation practice.
7.2 Sticky base salaries.
A simple way to x our model would be to introduce a sticky base salary constraint. Assume that
CEOsbase salaries cannot be cut below a certain threshold value, and that this value coincides
with the observed base salary, so we would add the constraint   d to program (16). Then we
would nd immediately that all contracts are rationalized as optimal contracts of this modied
program. To see this, recall that our model trades o¤ a combination of options and base salary
against stock. Rebalancing the portfolio towards fewer options and more stock is feasible only if
we can reduce base salaries at the same time, we cannot just shift between stock and options.
Mathematically, adding the minimum salary constraint leads to a program where the solution is
already determined by the constraints, so no further optimization is possible.
Note that a lower bound on base salaries and the participation constraint cannot bind at the
same time. A binding downwards constraint on salaries therefore implies that the participation
constraint (7) is not binding, so that the solution is dened by the incentive compatibility con-
straint (8). If we add one stock option to the CEOs compensation package, then this increases
compensation costs by the Black-Scholes value BS and the pay for performance sensitivity by the
option delta N (d1) < 1. Hence, the price per unit of incentives is BS=N (d1). The delta of a
share is 1 and it costs P0. Hence, stock options are always cheaper in providing incentives as
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BS=N (d1) < P0. Delta may be adjusted to allow for risk aversion and exposure to rm-specic
risk. This argument is correct if we ask: what is the best form to provide incentives, holding base
salary constant? In a model like ours where base salaries can vary, the comparison of dollar costs
of pay for performance sensitivity is irrelevant: then we must compare the CEOs risk premiums
for options and for stock. This analysis also sheds some light on the small fraction of CEOs with
positive option holdings discovered before (1.3% for  = 3, see Tables 2, 3). These CEOs have very
little wealth and not all of their option holdings can be replaced with stock without violating the
constraint that +W0  0.36
One plausible economic reason for sticky CEO base salaries are liquidity constraints: if the CEO
demands some compensation to nance consumption today because she cannot borrow against
future compensation, then she will not accept a contract that o¤ers more deferred compensation
in exchange for a lower base salary. If this liquidity hypothesis were the correct explanation of the
usage of stock options, then we should observe more options in the compensation packages of those
CEOs who have lower wealth, other things being equal. Also, CEOs of larger rms should nd it
more di¢ cult to purchase additional stock to provide signicant incentives. Table 9 investigates if
these predictions are borne out by the data. The dependent variable is the proportion of options
in the risk-neutral pay for performance sensitivity, dened as:
Proportion of options =
nON (d1)
nON (d1) + nS
:
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Initial wealth and rm size (measured by the log of market capitalization) both have a highly
signicant e¤ect on the proportion of options. As expected, the e¤ect of initial wealth is negative
and the e¤ect of rm size is positive. Even though the slope estimates are highly signicant, the
economic e¤ects are rather small, even after controlling for volatility (cf. regression (4)): doubling a
CEOs wealth decreases the proportion of options in her incentive pay by only about 5.9 percentage
points. Similarly, doubling the market capitalization of her company increases her proportion of
options by about 4.2 percentage points. Also, the adjusted R-squared is only 14% and a large part
of the variation in the proportion of options remains unexplained. Our dataset contains some very
36 It seems that the imposition of a more stringent limited liability constraint also explains most of the apparent
di¤erence between Lambert and Larckers (2004) results and ours. They also make somewhat di¤erent parametric
assumptions and allow the level of incentives to vary in their example. We suspect that loosening the limited liability
constraint in their analysis would dramatically reduce the optimal option holdings they nd.
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wealthy CEOs who hold options (e. g. Michael Dell), and it seems implausible that they could
be liquidity-constrained. Also companies might underwrite a loan and thereby help to overcome
liquidity constraints. Hence, the liquidity hypothesis remains somewhat unconvincing and cannot
explain most of the variation in the data.
We also suspect that liquidity constraints are stronger for younger CEOs and those who have
joined the company more recently. With increasing age and tenure, CEOs would then successively
exercise options and hold more stock of the company. This hypothesis is borne out by the data
(see regressions (5) - (7) in Table 9), but again, the quantitative impact is small: an increase in
tenure of 1 year reduces the proportion of options by 0.7%, so a CEO who has been with the rm
for 10 years has on average 7% less of her incentive pay in options compared to a CEO who has just
joined. Table 9 is also useful for comparing our methodology with regression analysis: all variables
in Table 9 are signicant and have the predicted signs. This indicates that the models qualitative
implications are correct, even though the quantitative implications do not get close to matching
the data.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
We analyze executive compensation contracts using a standard, one-period principal agent model of
e¢ cient contracting with CRRA-utility and lognormal distribution of stock prices and estimate it
for a sample of 598 US CEOs. Our assumptions are widely used in the compensation literature, but
the model yields predictions that markedly di¤er from observed compensation schemes. Generally,
the model predicts that optimal compensation schemes should have no or at best miniscule holdings
of stock options, and that incentives should be provided through restricted stock. In addition, base
salaries should be lower, and many CEOs would be required to invest some of their savings into
their companys stock. By switching from observed contracts to optimal contracts, companies could
realize economically signicant savings. These results are robust to several model variations and
extensions. We therefore feel compelled to conclude that neither the conventional model nor any
of its obvious extensions or modications explain the pervasive practice of awarding stock options
to CEOs. The economic signicance of our results may be exaggerated quantitatively by using
data from the year 2000, which saw a peak in option compensation.37 We would therefore expect
37Towers Perrin (2004) reported in 2004 that (...) run rates have decreased over the past three years as companies
have begun to shift their equity compensation from primarily stock options to more full-value shares.
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that using more recent data would change our numbers, however, without inuencing our general,
qualitative conclusions.
There are two alternative ways to interpret these results. One possibility is to conclude that
CEO compensation does not follow the e¢ cient contracting paradigm and that CEOs use options
as a vehicle to extract rents from shareholders. This view coincides with the popular argument that
options are a form of hidden compensation that is not fully perceived by the market, as expressed by
managersresistance to the expensing of employee stock options (see Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan,
1996).38 ;39 We therefore also considered the hypothesis that potential savings from switching to
the optimal contract are higher in rms with weak corporate governance. We conducted a rather
preliminary analysis and found mixed support for this hypothesis. We do not report our results as
this discussion clearly extends beyond the scope of our paper and should be the subject of further
research. Our main contribution to this literature is our savings variable that can be interpreted as
a measure of contractual ine¢ ciency. If the ine¢ cient contracting view is correct, then our measure
of contracting ine¢ ciency should be related to measures of e¤ective corporate governance.40
The alternative conclusion is to reject our model and to search for alternative models that can
better explain observed compensation practice. We consider three di¤erent model extensions in this
paper. While none of them can individually explain a substantial part of observed option holdings,
they may be part of a more complex explanation:
 Options may be awarded to provide incentives to invest in risky projects rather than (or
in addition to) e¤ort incentives. We show that this argument rules out concave contracts.
Concave contracts lead to even higher savings than the linear no optionscontract in our
modelling framework, but they severely reduce CEOsinvestment incentives. On the other
hand, the linear no optionscontract reduces the incentives to invest only slightly, so this
argument seems unable to explain why so many compensation packages contain stock options.
 Taxes favor options, and we show that predicted option holdings increase markedly when
38Guay, Kothari, and Sloan (2003) hold against this that the costs of stock options are much larger than could be
justied by revealed preferences to report higher earnings.
39 It is di¢ cult to reconcile the ine¢ cient contracting view with other evidence in the literature. See Core,
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000)
for evidence on systematic variations between economic variables and CEO compensation that corroborates e¢ cient
contracting models. Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) and Hanlon, Shevlin and Rajgopal (2003) nd evidence for the
performance impact of stock options. The latter study concludes that there is little evidence for rent extraction.
40To facilitate future research on this issue, we provide our savings variable for each CEO for a number of years on
www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/...
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personal and corporate taxes are taken into account. Still, predicted and observed option
holdings di¤er by several orders of magnitude.
 If CEOs are liquidity constrained, then their base salaries cannot decrease and observed option
holdings are automatically optimal. Our regression results provide only limited support for
the hypothesis that CEOs are liquidity constrained. Nevertheless, liquidity constraints might
explain observed option holdings for a few young and relatively poor CEOs.41
A number of further explanations for the use of stock options have been put forward in the
literature and might turn out to be successful in aligning theory and compensation practice. Oyer
and Schaefer (2005) suggest that CEOs may be overcondent or overly optimistic about the fu-
ture development of the stock of their companies. We actually replicated their results and found
qualitatively very similar conclusions, namely only very moderate increases in option holdings.
Holmström and Ricarti Costa (1986) and Nohel and Todd (2005) consider career concerns, Jost
and Wol¤ (2003) model preferences based on loss aversion rather than expected utility, Oyer (2004)
analyzes employee retention, and Inderst and Müller (2003) discuss incentives to make optimal liq-
uidation decisions. Behavioral biases like valuation errors in capital markets may also account for
the widespread use of options: Garvey and Milbourn (2002) show for instance that stock markets
underestimate the dilution e¤ect of stock options. Also, the use of stock options could possibly
be better explained in adverse selection models instead of the e¤ort aversion approach followed
in this paper. Dybvig and Zender (1991) show for instance that contracts based on xed salaries
and (restricted) stock alone cannot prevent the CEO from making ine¢ cient investment decisions.
Another avenue for further research may be the explicit consideration of the dynamic aspects of
contract negotiation. The standard model and its variants discussed in this paper are static and as
a result any empirical implementation ignores the fact that contracts are adjusted every year and
that the structure of contracts today determines the positions of each party in future negotiations.
We regard the search for a parsimonious model that explains existing compensation practice
as an important task for future research. This model should provide a more satisfactory answer
to questions of optimal option design (such as reloading, repricing, indexing, or strike prices) that
have so far been analyzed in the context of a model that is unable to generate optimal contracts
with options.





A.1 Solving for the General Contract
In this appendix we discuss a more general contract that can be written as a general pay-function
 (PT ), which denotes the compensation the manager receives at time T . From (1), PT is distributed
lognormal with parameters  (e) and 2T , where







Then log (PT ) =  (e)+u
p
T is normal with mean  (e) and standard deviation 
p
T . We denote
the density of PT for a given level of e¤ort e by f (PT je):











Then the likelihood ratio is
df (PT je) =de
f (PT je) = 
0 (e)
lnPT    (e)
2T
with 0 (e) = P 00 (e) =P0 (e). This maps our model into Holmströms (1979) framework. Denote the
Lagrange multipliers on the participation constraint (PC) and the incentive compatibility constraint
(IC) by PC and IC respectively. Both Lagrange multipliers need to be positive. Then the optimal
contract  (PT ) for a given level of e¤ort e is fully described by Holmströms equation (7), adapted
to our model:
(W0 exp (rfT ) + 
 (PT )) = PC + IC0 (e)
lnPT    (e)
2T
 0 + 1 lnPT ; (22)





> 0 ; 0 = PC   1 (e) :
Observe that the limited wealth constraint (10) implies that WT  0 for all PT , so the argument of
the utility function cannot be negative. Similarly, the principal enjoys limited liability and cannot
pay a compensation larger than the value of the rm itself. Therefore, the constraints on  (PT )
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are:42
 W0 exp (rfT )   (PT )  PT :
However, the right hand side of (22) will be negative for PT < exp ( 0=1). We therefore obtain
(18), once we require a minimum level of consumption "  0 for the CEO. Standard analysis of
(18) yields the following results. The solution  to the optimal contracting problem is constant
at  W0 exp (rfT ) for all prices below PT . At PT = P = exp (("   0) =1) the function is not
di¤erentiable and to the right of PT = P its slope is positive. The function is convex at PT = P : for





. The function is concave over the whole interval
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and concave to the right of this interval, with an inection point that is decreasing in . The
optimal contract  (PT ) is therefore neither convex nor concave.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1:
We prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose there would be an optimal e¤ort level e < e. This
e¤ort level would have to satisfy (15), so that UPPS (; nS ; n

O; ; P (e
)) = k (e). Note that
k (e) is strictly increasing in e:
dk (e)
de
= exp ( rfT ) C
00 (e)P 0 (e)  C 0 (e)P 00 (e)
P 0 (e)2
> 0 ;
as C and P are both increasing and C is convex and P is concave. However, then (15) can only be
satised if
UPPS (; nS ; n

O; ; P (e
)) < UPPS (; nS ; n

O; ; P (e)) = UPPS





which is ruled out by (17). For nO  0, E [U (WT ; e)] is a concave function of P , as U is concave
and WT is then linear in PT . Then (17) is always satised.
42For a discussion on limits on the sharing function  see also Holmström (1979), p. 77.
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B Construction of the Dataset
This appendix provides a more detailed discussion of the construction of our non-rm wealth
variable W0 and the representative option.
Wealth. Every CEO is assumed to have zero wealth on the date when she enters the database.
Denote the end of the scal year when the CEO enters the database by tE , so we assume that
WtE 1 = 0. Similarly, denote the end of the scal year where we observe and evaluate the contract
by t0 (today). Then for each year we calculate the CEOs net cash inow as follows:
Fixed salary (after tax)
+ Dividend income from shares held in own company (after tax)
+ Value of restricted stock granted
  Personal taxes on restricted stock that vest during the year
+ Net value realized from exercising options (after tax)
  Cash paid for purchasing additional stock
= Cash Income.
Here, xed salary is dened as the sum of the following four ExecuComp data types: Salary,
Bonus, Other Annual, All Other Total, and long-term incentive pay (LTIP). Following Hall and
Liebman (2000), we use the following personal tax rates: 31% for 1992, 39.6% for 1993, and 42%
from 1994 onwards.
As ExecuComp records only the value but not the number of restricted shares granted, we add
the value to cash income and deduct the cash needed for purchasing the change in stockholdings.
Likewise, we add the value realized from exercising options. So if the CEO exercises n options but
does not sell any shares and does not receive any restricted stock grants in this period, we add the
net value realized from exercising the options (i.e. the value of the n shares at the time the options
were exercised minus the strike price) to cash income and deduct n times the market price of the
shares at scal year end. Due to uctuations in stock prices, this method will lead to some errors.
However, there is no alternative to this approach, because we do not know the strike price of the
options exercised. If the CEO sells more shares than she receives from restricted grants or exercising
options, her stock holdings decrease and the item cash paid for purchasing additional stockabove
becomes negative. If a CEO changed her employer during her history in the database, we assume
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that she sold all unrestricted stock in the old company and exercised all exercisable options for
which we know the strike price before she has been hired by the new company. Restricted stock
and unexercisable options are assumed to be lost. In addition, we assume that she bought the
shares held in the new company that were not granted to her in the rst year.
Denote the cash inow during scal year t by yt. We assume that the CEO invests all her surplus
cash at the risk-free rate of interest and does not consume. We assume that all cash inows are
realized at the end of the scal year and invested at the risk-free rate rt+1f during the next scal year.
Data on the annual one-year risk-free rate rf has been obtained from the Federal Reserve Boards
website (http://www.federalreserve.gov). Then we obtain our estimate for the CEOs (non-stock)
wealth:










Stock Options. We approximate the options portfolios held by the CEOs at the end of the
1999 scal year using the algorithm proposed by Core and Guay (2002a). Then we construct a
representative option that summarizes the salient features of this option portfolio. We do this by
creating a composite option that matches the value and the option delta of the option portfolio.
Denote the number of options of type  (with strike price K and maturity T  ) by nO. We set the




O and denote by BS the Black-Scholes
value of this option and by N (d1) the option delta. Then we determine the maturity T and the




 ; ; rf ; 0:7T




1) = nON (d1) : (25)
Conditions (24) and (25) form a system of two equations in the two unknowns K, T , which
represent the free parameters of the composite option. We take into account the fact that most
CEOs exercise their stock options before maturity by multiplying T  by 0:7 before calculating
the representative option (see Huddart and Lang, 1996, and Carpenter, 1998). For rf we use
the U.S. government bond yield with 6-year maturity from January 2000, because the average
maturity of the representative options is 5.9 years in our sample as shown in Table 1. The two
remaining parameters (P0, ) are given by the data. Hence, our procedure establishes parameters
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for the options that do not change the value of these options to shareholders and how this valuation
changes as a function of the stock price. For CEOs who do not have any options, we set K = P0
and T = 10 as these are the typical values for newly granted options.
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Table 1: Description of the dataset 
This table displays mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of twelve variables. Panel A 
describes our sample of 598 US CEOs. Panel B describes all 1,417 executives who were CEO in 2000 
according to the ExecuComp database. Panel B also contains the statistic of the two-sample t-test for equal 
mean (allowing for different variances). Before calculating this statistic, we removed all observations from 
the sample in Panel B that are also contained in the sample in Panel A. 
 
Panel A: Dataset with 598 U.S. CEOs 
 
Variable Symbol Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Base Salary ($ '000) φ 2,037 1,261 2,570 97 22,109 
Stock (%) nS 2.29% 0.29% 6.00% 0.00% 46.34% 
Options (%) nO 1.29% 0.84% 1.82% 0.00% 24.32% 
Options adjusted (%) nO⋅exp{-dT} 1.22% 0.76% 1.79% 0.00% 24.32% 
Value of stock ($ mil) nS⋅P0 91.98 6.62 571.95 0.00 11,814.08 
Value of options ($ mil) nO⋅BS 29.47 6.11 104.42 0.00 1,334.43 
Market Value ($ mil) P0 9,857 1,668 27,845 7 280,114 
Wealth ($ mil) W0 34.60 6.86 234.79 0.03 5,431.72 
Option Delta N(d1) 0.834 0.856 0.126 0.001 1.000 
Maturity (years) T 5.89 5.54 1.96 1.20 22.18 
Volatility σ 0.377 0.335 0.196 0.136 3.487 
Age of CEO  57 57 7 36 84 
 
Panel B: All 1,417 ExecuComp CEOs in 2000 
 
Variable Symbol Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum T-test statistic 
Base Salary ($ '000) φ 1,718 1,059 3,150 0 90,000 3.43 
Stock (%) nS 2.97% 0.35% 6.78% 0.00% 56.42% -3.32 
Options (%) nO 1.45% 0.96% 1.88% 0.00% 27.93% -2.74 
Value of stock ($ mil) nS·P0 132.44 6.45 1,385.87 0.00 47,838.75 -1.07 
Market Value ($ mil.) P0 8,012 1,256 27,551 7 508,329 2.15 
Stock Price Volatility σ 0.435 0.384 0.205 0.136 3.487 -9.36 
Age of CEO   55 55 8 29 86 7.41 
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Table 2: Optimal contracts with non-negative option holdings 
This table describes the optimal restricted option contract, i.e. the optimal contract subject to the constraint 
that option holdings must be non-negative (nO ≥ 0). Panel A displays mean and median of the three contract 
parameters: base salary φ*, stock holdings nS* and adjusted option holdings nO* exp{–dT}. In addition, it 
shows the fraction of CEOs with positive option holdings (nO* > 0) and the fraction of CEOs with negative 
base salaries (φ* < 0). Panel B describes the additional investment the CEO should make into her own 
company according to the optimal contract, and the savings the firm could realize by switching from 
observed contracts to optimal contracts. Wealth that must be invested is equal to –min(φ*, 0). Investment 
relative to wealth is this investment scaled by the CEO’s wealth, –min(φ*, 0)/W0. Savings are the difference 
in compensation costs between observed contracts and optimal contracts, π0d – π0*. Savings in percent of 
total pay are (π0d – π0*)/π0d, and savings in percent of firm value are (π0d – π0*)/P0. Results are shown for 
nine different values of the parameter of risk aversion γ. For γ = 0.5, the table contains 3 CEOs for which 
we could not verify condition (17). This condition ensures that the first-order approach is always valid. For 
all remaining γ–CEO combinations condition (17) could be verified. 
 
Panel A: Parameters of optimal contracts 
 
Base salary 
($ ‘000)  Stock holdings  Option holdingsRisk aversion 
Number 
of CEOs Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median
Fraction 
with 




0.5 596 -5,593 -1,959 3.186% 1.035% 0.065% 0.000% 17.45% 78.69% 
1 597 -4,659 -1,406 3.089% 0.987% 0.038% 0.000% 11.39% 72.53% 
2 598 -2,997 -380 2.897% 0.829% 0.012% 0.000% 5.18% 61.04% 
3 598 -1,652 92 2.746% 0.724% 0.003% 0.000% 1.34% 46.99% 
4 598 -651 321 2.639% 0.640% 0.000% 0.000% 0.33% 35.28% 
5 598 44 491 2.563% 0.570% 0.000% 0.000% 0.00% 25.42% 
6 598 519 625 2.508% 0.513% 0.000% 0.000% 0.00% 18.39% 
8 598 1,091 803 2.438% 0.441% 0.000% 0.000% 0.00% 10.03% 
10 598 1,402 941 2.396% 0.414% 0.000% 0.000% 0.00% 5.52% 
 
Panel B: CEO investment and firm savings 
 
Wealth that must be 
invested (mean)   Savings ($ '000)  
Savings in percent 
of total pay   
Savings in percent 
of firm value Risk aversion in $'000 % of wealth   Mean Median  Mean Median   Mean Median
0.5 5,830 38.50%  673 197  1.73% 1.02%  0.04% 0.01% 
1 4,956 31.43%  2,229 567  4.93% 3.25%  0.10% 0.03% 
2 3,435 18.74%  7,156 1,513  12.77% 9.42%  0.23% 0.08% 
3 2,258 10.51%  12,278 2,449  19.58% 15.58%  0.34% 0.14% 
4 1,432 5.42%  16,156 3,297  24.54% 20.50%  0.42% 0.19% 
5 926 2.92%  19,013 3,884  28.11% 24.74%  0.47% 0.22% 
6 614 1.63%  21,121 4,395  30.76% 28.32%  0.52% 0.25% 
8 287 0.59%  23,850 4,925  34.30% 32.76%  0.57% 0.29% 
10 155 0.26%   25,493 5,234  36.49% 35.46%   0.60% 0.31% 
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Table 3: Optimal contracts with unrestricted option holdings 
This table describes the optimal unrestricted option contract, i.e. the optimal contract under the weaker 
restriction that the CEO cannot sell more options than the number of shares she owns (nS + nO exp{–dT} ≥ 
0). Panel A displays mean and median of the three contract parameters: base salary φ*, stock holdings nS* 
(which is the Pay for Performance Sensitivity for PT < K), and the sum of stock holdings and adjusted 
option holdings nS* + nO* exp{–dT} (which is the Pay for Performance Sensitivity for PT > K). In addition, 
the table shows the fraction of CEOs with Pay for Performance Sensitivity equal to zero for PT > K (nS* + 
nO* exp{–dT} = 0) and the fraction of CEOs with negative base salary (φ* < 0). Panel B describes the 
additional investment the CEO should make into her own company according to the optimal contract, and 
the savings the firm could realize by switching from observed contracts to optimal contracts. Wealth that 
must be invested is equal to –min(φ*, 0). Investment relative to wealth is this investment scaled by the 
CEO’s wealth, –min(φ*, 0)/W0. Savings are the difference in compensation costs between observed 
contracts and optimal contracts, π0d – π0*. Savings in percent of total pay are (π0d – π0*)/π0d, and savings in 
percent of firm value are (π0d – π0*)/P0. Results are shown for nine different values of the parameter of risk 
aversion γ. For γ = 0.5, the table contains 3 CEOs for which we could not verify condition (17). This 
condition ensures that the first-order approach is always valid. For all remaining γ–CEO combinations 
condition (17) could be verified. 
 
Panel A: Parameters of optimal contracts 
 
Base salary 
($ ‘000)  
Stock holdings 
(PPS for PT < K)





Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median
Fraction 
with PPS=0 




0.5 597 -28,871 -5,638  6.523% 1.759% 2.414% 0.757% 0.17% 96.48% 
1 597 -28,157 -5,521  6.591% 1.841% 1.817% 0.503% 0.34% 94.81% 
2 597 -22,983 -4,232  6.163% 1.745% 0.810% 0.133% 1.68% 90.28% 
3 597 -16,572 -2,893  5.328% 1.414% 0.392% 0.043% 6.70% 84.09% 
4 596 -12,056 -1,718  4.647% 1.187% 0.220% 0.018% 13.76% 76.17% 
5 592 -8,872 -773  4.148% 1.011% 0.136% 0.009% 23.82% 67.23% 
6 588 -6,497 -278  3.794% 0.884% 0.078% 0.004% 31.80% 59.18% 
8 570 -3,452 168  3.421% 0.717% 0.024% 0.002% 46.32% 43.16% 
10 560 -1,663 413   3.138% 0.614%  0.008% 0.000% 56.96% 32.14% 
 
Panel B: CEO investment and firm savings 
 
Wealth that must be 
invested (mean)   Savings ($ '000)  
Savings in percent 
of total pay   
Savings in percent 
of firm value Risk aversion in $'000 % of wealth   Mean Median  Mean Median   Mean Median
0.5 28,909 81.97%  3,640 339  3.54% 1.78%  0.13% 0.02% 
1 28,204 78.37%  14,053 1,183  10.38% 6.07%  0.36% 0.06% 
2 23,073 64.28%  38,481 3,852  25.57% 20.59%  0.86% 0.22% 
3 16,735 47.48%  54,324 6,221  36.54% 32.42%  1.17% 0.33% 
4 12,315 33.68%  65,471 7,731  43.71% 42.31%  1.38% 0.41% 
5 9,232 23.30%  73,309 8,319  48.14% 47.58%  1.52% 0.46% 
6 6,979 16.24%  78,468 9,481  51.45% 51.97%  1.63% 0.49% 
8 4,157 8.12%  85,431 10,339  55.73% 56.48%  1.80% 0.55% 
10 2,569 4.29%   82,490 10,172  57.91% 59.21%   1.89% 0.59% 
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Table 4: Optimal general nonlinear contract 
This table describes the optimal contract with the general nonlinear pay function =)( TPπ  
)exp(},)lnmin{( 0
1
10 TrWP fT −+ εαα γ  from equation (18). We do not tabulate summary statistics for the 
parameters α0, α1, and ε, because they cannot be interpreted independently of each other. Instead, the table 
displays the median cut-off point 0/ PP  (where P  is the point where the minimum ε is attained) and the 
median change in wealth when the stock price changes from PT(0) to PT(u) where u = –4, –1, +1, +4. In 
addition, the table shows average savings as percentage of total pay (π0d – π0*)/π0d from switching from 
observed contracts to optimal contracts. Results are shown for nine different values of the parameter of risk 
aversion γ. For all γ–CEO combinations the general validity of the first-order approach (condition (17)) 
could be verified. The last row shows the corresponding statistics for the observed contracts. Results for γ = 
1 are not comparable to the results for other values of γ, because the utility function is not continuous in γ at 
γ = 1. 
 
Median change in wealth if random variable u ... 










0.5 595 7.12% 70.03% 391.02% -51.55% -99.89% 4.79% 
1 542 12.08% 38.34% 153.37% -38.34% -99.94% 14.31% 
2 596 4.21% 11.99% 42.00% -13.63% -99.58% 33.90% 
3 596 1.34% 5.92% 20.58% -6.72% -37.27% 45.19% 
4 596 0.53% 3.67% 12.81% -4.12% -21.47% 51.82% 
5 593 0.26% 2.56% 9.01% -2.85% -14.35% 56.19% 
6 587 0.13% 1.92% 6.78% -2.12% -10.40% 59.07% 
8 508 0.04% 1.23% 4.39% -1.34% -6.38% 63.27% 
10 286 0.04% 0.90% 3.23%  -0.98% -4.58% 65.41% 
Observed 
Contract 598 N/A 107.40% 2044.30%  -27.36% -40.96% 0.00% 
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Table 5: Investment incentives 
This table displays results on the change of the CEO’s utility to an increase in the firm’s volatility by 0.01 
for the different types of contracts, i.e.  
 
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ]( , , , 0.01) ( , , , ) ( , , , ) .S O S O S OE V n n E V n n E V n nφ σ φ σ φ σ+ −  
 
Panel A shows the mean and the median of this change for four different contracts: the observed contract, 
the restricted option contract, the unrestricted option contract, and the general nonlinear contract. Panel B 
contains the proportion of CEOs we classify as risk-neutral under each of the four contracts. We use two 
different definitions of ‘risk-neutral’: in the left part of Panel B, we call a CEO ‘risk-neutral’ if her 
sensitivity to a 0.01 increase in volatility (as defined above) exceeds –0.01. In the right part of Panel A, we 
classify a CEO as ‘risk-neutral’ if the sensitivity exceeds –0.001. Results are shown for nine different 
values of the parameter of risk aversion γ. We only include those CEO–γ–combinations, for which we could 
calculate all three contracts. Results for γ = 1 are not comparable to the results for other values of γ, because 
the utility function is not continuous in γ at γ = 1. 
 
Panel A: Sensitivity of the CEO’s utility to an increase in volatility by 1 percentage 
point 
 
Observed contract   Restricted option contract  
Unrestricted 







CEOs Mean Median   Mean Median  Mean Median   Mean Median 
0.5 594 -0.16% -0.13%  -0.31% -0.28% -0.49% -0.46%  -0.75% -0.72%
1 541 -4.42% -0.60%  -6.48% -0.99% -8.33% -1.56%  -15.61% -2.58%
2 595 -1.15% -0.88%  -1.46% -1.22% -2.14% -2.00%  -5.92% -5.58%
3 596 -2.51% -1.90%  -3.00% -2.35% -4.42% -3.90%  -18.37% -16.15%
4 595 -3.81% -2.80%  -4.36% -3.39% -6.35% -5.20%  -39.67% -32.27%
5 588 -4.99% -3.60%  -5.55% -4.23% -7.89% -6.03%  -77.98% -54.83%
6 578 -6.05% -4.28%  -6.58% -4.83% -9.04% -6.76%  -153.77% -86.16%
8 484 -7.73% -5.35%  -8.23% -5.92% -10.73% -7.72%  -360.41% -208.74%
10 259 -8.88% -6.77%   -9.43% -7.22%  -12.06% -9.06%   -1119.35% -530.20%
 
Panel B: CEO’s attitude towards risk 
 
Risk-neutrality defined as sensitivity > -1%  Risk-neutrality defined as sensitivity > -0.1% Risk 
aver-




















0.5 99.66% 99.16% 97.47% 76.09% 44.44% 15.66% 1.85% 0.84%
1 65.62% 50.28% 33.09% 19.96% 19.78% 7.02% 1.85% 0.92%
2 55.80% 40.50% 20.17% 6.05% 9.58% 2.69% 0.50% 0.17%
3 26.34% 18.62% 8.72% 1.34% 4.70% 0.50% 0.00% 0.00%
4 17.31% 11.43% 5.88% 0.50% 2.69% 0.34% 0.00% 0.00%
5 12.93% 8.33% 3.40% 0.00% 2.04% 0.17% 0.00% 0.00%
6 10.21% 6.57% 2.94% 0.00% 1.73% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
8 6.40% 3.51% 1.45% 0.00% 0.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
10 2.70% 1.16% 0.77% 0.00%  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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Table 6: Dismissals and UPPS 
This table shows the change of the CEOs’ utility-adjusted pay for performance sensitivity (UPPS) and the 
change of their expected utility when the threat of being dismissed is taken into account. ‘Change in UPPS’ 
is UPPS in the model with threat of dismissal divided by UPPS in the model without threat of dismissal 
minus one. In order to specify the probability of dismissal, we estimated a logit regression where the 
dependent variable is equal to one if an executive who is CEO in 1995 leaves the company within the next 
five years and if ExecuComp records “resigned” as the reason for leaving. The independent variable is the 
firm’s abnormal return over these five years, i.e. the log of the firm’s gross return minus the log of the 
S&P500 gross return. The parameter estimates (standard errors) are -2.704 (0.136) for the intercept and  
-0.415 (0.077) for the slope. The change in expected utility can drop below -100%, as expected utility is 
negative for γ >1. Results for γ = 1 are not comparable to the results for other values of γ, because the utility 
function is not continuous in γ at γ = 1. 
 
Change in UPPS Change in expected utility Risk 
aversion mean median  mean median 
0.5 -4.17% -4.11% -2.63% -2.59% 
1 -2.59% -2.59% -30.09% -5.67% 
2 0.96% 0.60% -6.51% -5.95% 
3 4.85% 3.93% -14.39% -12.62% 
4 9.06% 7.24% -23.72% -19.87% 
5 13.62% 10.59% -35.05% -27.64% 
6 18.64% 14.13% -49.49% -36.22% 
8 30.51% 21.40% -100.41% -55.17% 





Table 7: Optimal contracts with Gamma-distributed stock price 
This table displays the means of six variables that describe the optimal restricted option contract for the 
alternative model in which the stock price PT follows a Gamma distribution. The table displays the mean of 
the three contract parameters: base salary φ*, stock holdings nS* and adjusted option holdings nO* exp{–dT}. 
In addition, it shows the fraction of CEOs with positive option holdings (nO* > 0). Savings are the 
difference in compensation costs between observed contracts and optimal contracts, π0d – π0*. Savings in 
percent of total pay are (π0d – π0*)/π0d. Results are shown for nine different values of the parameter of risk 
aversion γ. The number of CEOs for whom we could not verify the sufficient condition (17) is shown in the 


























0.5 584 527 12,893 0.985% 2.542% 100.00% 569 0.179%
1 583 1 -3,610 3.095% 0.029% 14.75% 332 0.962%
2 584 1 -1,845 2.917% 0.005% 2.23% 4,961 8.279%
3 584 0 -549 2.729% 0.001% 0.34% 11,516 16.983%
4 584 0 292 2.592% 0.000% 0.17% 16,577 23.535%
5 584 0 814 2.500% 0.000% 0.17% 19,943 28.114%
6 584 0 1,156 2.437% 0.000% 0.17% 22,212 31.400%
8 584 0 1,538 2.359% 0.000% 0.17% 24,923 35.593%
10 584 1 1,757 2.313% 0.009% 0.34% 25,609 37.414%
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Table 8: Optimal contracts with personal and corporate taxes 
This table displays the means of six variables that describe the optimal restricted option contract for the 
extended model which takes into account personal and corporate taxes. The table displays the mean of the 
three contract parameters: base salary φ*, stock holdings nS* and adjusted option holdings nO* exp{–dT}. In 
addition, it shows the fraction of CEOs with positive option holdings (nO* > 0). Savings are the difference 
in compensation costs between observed contracts and optimal contracts, π0d – π0*. Savings in percent of 
total pay are (π0d – π0*)/π0d. Results are shown for nine different values of the parameter of risk aversion γ. 
The number of CEOs for whom we could not verify the sufficient condition (17) is shown in the column 


























0.5 593 248 440 2.857% 0.494% 59.36% 301 0.943% 
1 594 146 -804 2.940% 0.263% 42.93% 1,023 2.698% 
2 597 55 -1,269 2.870% 0.087% 19.10% 3,655 7.990% 
3 595 26 -758 2.779% 0.028% 9.58% 6,628 13.435% 
4 595 15 -307 2.682% 0.036% 5.88% 8,962 17.461% 
5 597 11 169 2.600% 0.011% 4.36% 10,981 21.176% 
6 598 7 499 2.545% 0.007% 3.18% 12,435 23.740% 
8 598 3 992 2.470% 0.003% 2.34% 14,480 27.516% 





Table 9: Explaining options by wealth and firm size 
This table displays the results of seven OLS regressions of the proportion of options in risk-neutral pay for 
performance sensitivity nOd⋅N(d1)/(nOd⋅ N(d1) + nSd) on the log of wealth W0, the log of the firm value P0, 
the firm’s stock volatility, and the CEO’s age and job tenure. All regressions include an intercept (results 
not shown). The table displays the slope estimates and their standard errors in parentheses. * indicates 
significance at the 5% level. ** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Independent 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
-0.0510**   -0.0855**   -0.0924**log(W0) (0.0084)   (0.0092)   (0.0136) 
  0.0215**   0.0608**     0.0634** log(P0)   (0.0069)   (0.0078)     (0.0114) 
    0.0314 0.2206**    0.2759* Volatility     (0.0617) (0.0617)     (0.1310) 
    -0.0071**  0.0018 Age     (0.0017)  (0.0026) 
          -0.0070** -0.0057**Tenure           (0.0015) (0.0017) 
Adjusted R2 0.0568 0.0143 -0.0012 0.1417 0.0275 0.0697 0.2102 
Observations 598 598 598 598 560 289 268 
 
